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WARD AND GUARDIAN
What Counsel for the
Ward Can Learn
From Will Contests
By Alison McChrystal
Barnes
When courts base their
determinations of competency
on a preference for family
control of assets, the
property rights of older
people are diminished. For
elder law advocates to
protect their clients' interest
in controlling their own
property, it is necessary to
move the recognit
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show that few limited guardian-
ships are created to preserve for
elderly wards any powers to act
for themselves or determine their
living situations, though some
wards are capable of doing So. 2
The appointment of counsel
for the prospective ward seldom
results in zealous advocacy.3
One detailed study found that
the respondent's lawyer might
actually sit silent throughout the
hearing.4 A majority of wards
were absent from the adjudica-
tion of their incompetency.s
ion of the Another Reform Failure:
radigm in Inheritance Law
p and will The failure of statutory reform
ond mere resembles the failures in another
anecdote. area of law, the law of wills andinheritance. Critical commentary
caused a relaxation of the for-
entary on malities requirements in the 1990
p reveals revision of the Uniform Probate
statutory Code (U.P.C.).6 In addition, the
oduce few 1990 reform included a new pro-
s.' Major vision with a dispensing power
p case files that allows the court to admit to
probate wills with flawed for-
is a malities, provided that it finds
estie clear and convincing evidence
uettethat the decedent intended the
isconsi. document to be his or herwill. 7
be the Libra
Aersity of The reforms were intended to
give expression more often to
the testator's intent by reducing
the number of wills rejected for
failure to fully comply with for-
malities requirements. It was
anticipated that the result would
be the development of legal prin-
ciples for determining the testa-
tor's intent.
Few states have adopted these
U.P.C. provisions.8 Further, re-
searchers reviewing probate court
judgments since the adoption of
these provisions by several states
show that the reforms have not
significantly changed the courts'
rejection based on a finding of
lack of intent.9
Where they have been adopt-
ed, courts continue to decide
cases seemingly without defin-
ing principles, and without ref-
erence to the statutory law.10
The opinions vary from case to
case in the rigor with which they
view formalities flaws and other
evidence of intent. For example,
in one case a will signed by the
witnesses out of the actual line
of sight of the testator is consid-
ered to be witnessed "in the con-
scious presence" of that testator
and admitted, while on similar
facts another will is rejected by
the same court. 1
In neither case is there evi-
dence that the will provisions are
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suspect, yet one testator's instruc-
tions are thrown out and the law
of intestacy applied instead.
As with guardianship reform,
it is useful to inquire just why
the conscientiously crafted revi-
sion is ineffective. In will con-
tests, it appears, the courts' deci-
sions frequently rely on family
ties to indicate who are the cor-
rect beneficiaries, rather than
searching for the testator's
intent. 12 Thus, the flaw in for-
malities is sufficient basis to
reject the will as invalid when
the disposition of the property is
nontraditional, while the simi-
larly executed will document
that makes a disposition to close
family members is valid.
Similarly, the courts manipu-
late the doctrine of undue influ-
ence to the point where its legal
significance is in doubt.13 A find-
ing of undue influence is based
on evidence that the testator was
coerced to make the provisions
of his or her will by the influen-
tial words or acts of another, or
that the influence imposes such
control over the testator that the
will of the other person is substi-
tuted for the testator. Undue
influence can be inferred from
the existence of a "confidential
relationship" between the testa-
tor and other person. However,
courts vary from case to case on
the evidence that makes a rela-
tionship "confidential ".14
The evidence of lack of mental
capacity to make a will is a par-
ticularly interesting illustration of
the preference for family mem-
bers, the so-called "family para-
digm". 15 In order to have suffi-
cient capacity, the testator must
know who are the "natural
objects of her bounty"-i.e., close
family members. Disposition to
one who is not related raises the
question of whether the testator
did in fact have that knowledge.
Thus, disposition to an unrelated
person provides part of the
proof that the testator lacked
capacity to make the will at all.
The Family Paradigm
A number of commentators on
will contests have considered the
family paradigm at work. One
envisions the preference for fami-
ly as arising from the (usually
implicit) promises exchanged in a
long-term relationship.16 For
example, the son provides atten-
tive and respectful care with the
implicit understanding that the
"family's" assets will someday
become his. It would be a betray-
al of this "contract" if the par-
ent's will gave the property to
others. Therefore, courts recog-
nize and enforce such promises
through the manipulation of wills
doctrines.17 This line of thinking
implies that the preference for
family generally is justified.
Another commentator ap-
proaches the question with objec-
tions to who is considered family
under the existing paradigm.18
The modern "family", she writes,
includes people who have made
commitments to one another,
and/or provide care and support,
without marriage or other fami-
ly status under the law. A revi-
sion of the family in the family
paradigm, then, might lead the
courts to continue support the
testator provided during life, or
award property to a non-family
member based on the worthiness
shown by providing care in the
testator's old age.
Reform of the law of wills has
been cut off in the courts by a
preference that close family
members, the traditional "natu-
ral objects of (an elder's) boun-
ty", take most of the property.
Those excluded may be close
friends, live-in companions, or
any non-family member the
elder designates. The commen-
tary cited here is critical of the
practice, but ultimately returns
to some version of the family
paradigm, calling for courts to
favor those who "acted like fam-
ily" to the decedent. The reform
in favor of individual choice for
the testator is cut off from its full
implementation.
Does the Family Paradigm
Impede Guardianship
Reform?
No similar research has taken
place in guardianship case law.
Indeed, it is possible that too few
appellate opinions exist involv-
ing guardianship for elders to
provide a discernable pattern.
Yet, the question arises regularly
as to whether older people are as
free to incur the costs of new ini-
tiatives and new relationships.'9
Indeed, guardianship has been
depicted as a tool for coercion of
uncooperative elders.20 The doc-
trine most likely to be subject to
the courts' manipulation is the
determination of competency
itself, an elusive concept poorly
encompassed by the law. 21
Without doubt, the same
results can be produced by
guardianship and wills contest:
the nullification of an elder's
choices about his or her proper-
ty. In each instance, the individ-
ual's freedom is curtailed and the
property is turned over to oth-
ers. The courts in will contests
prefer to provide property to
family; eighty-five percent of
guardians for the elderly are
.1151
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family members. 22
Many anecdotes among elder
law attorneys relate that family
members petition for guardian-
ship when they become alarmed
about their elder's spending. The
elder might meet a new romantic
interest and begin to spend on
travel, gifts, or even a home suit-
able to the new domestic situa-
tion. Alternatively, the elder
might endorse a cause or religious
group, and propose to donate
property. If the choices are made
by the living, the legal interven-
tion is a guardianship proceeding.
Do case opinions exist in suf-
ficient numbers to show a pat-
tern in guardianship? It remains
for elder law advocates to move
the recognition of the family par-
adigm in guardianship beyond
anecdote and establish whether
courts at least sometimes base
their determinations of compe-
tency on a preference for family
control of the assets. If this is so,
then older people have dimin-
ished property rights. Their
interest in controlling their own
property is deemed less impor-
tant than the interests of
younger family members who
expect to receive that property as
inheritance.
If this is true, then two possi-
ble actions follow:
First, advocates for elderly
wards must actively de-
fend their clients' rights to
spend their assets as they
wish, rather than presum-
ing that the courts decide
competency on the evi-
dence of decision-making
capabilities.
The elder's spending on a new
interest introduces an element to
the case that is ignored at peril to
the outcome.
* Second, it may be possible
to articulate the reasons
that elders' interests in
their property are in fact
sometimes diminished.
The implicit agreements of
long-term relationships may
have a valid role in determining
when the family can take control
in order to preserve some of the
assets. Understanding the nature
of the family's claim may lead to
fairer outcomes, in which elders
retain some freedom to spend.
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